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ABSTRACT
In the past years, regulators and the business communities had expressed worries about the alarming rate at which 
firms or corporations collapse due to the mismanagement and manipulation of resources as seen in the cases of Enron, 
WorldCom in the United States of America; and to be specific in Malaysia, the cases of Megan Media Holdings Berhad 
and Transmile Group. Auditor switching is evident and the disorder of auditor switching often takes place in Malaysia; 
however, as time goes by, it is decreasing. Thus, this paper seeks to empirically examine the effect of auditor switching 
and corporate governance on financial performance of Malaysian PLCs. Secondary data on a total number of 100 PLCs 
from years 2009 to 2013 are used. The results reveal that the effect of auditor switching on performance does not vary with 
duality role and the board size. However, the independent director does not cause a good firm performance. Nonetheless, 
auditors do not have a direct effect on financial performance since they are not directly involved with the management 
of the firms which negates the results of previous study. Therefore, this paper has vital impact in that regulators and the 
public need to be educated through awareness campaigns to emphasize on the auditors’ roles as agents in understanding 
the impact of the association between corporate governance and financial performance. Furthermore, auditor switching 
should embrace not only rotation of audit partners, but rotation of audit firms as well in view that this will help in infusing 
discipline from the top to the bottom of the audit firms and the companies. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; CEO/chairman duality; board size; independent directors; auditor switching; financial 
performance; Return on Assets (ROA); Return on Equity (ROE); Tobin’s Q; Malaysia
ABSTRAK
Sejak beberapa tahun kebelakangan ini, pihak berkuasa tempatan dan komuniti perniagaan telah menyatakan 
kebimbangan mengenai kadar kejatuhan firma atau syarikat yang disebabkan oleh salah tadbir urus dan manipulasi 
sumber seperti yang terjadi keatas kes Enron dan WorldCom di Amerika Syarikat dan kes Megan Media Holdings Berhad 
dan Transmile Group di Malaysia. Pertukaran juruaudit dan gangguan keatas pertukaran juruaudit sememangnya telah 
terbukti berlaku di Malaysia walaupun pada kadar yang menurun. Oleh itu, kertas kerja ini adalah bertujuan untuk 
mengkaji secara empirikal tentang kesan pertukaran juruaudit dan tadbir urus korporat terhadap prestasi kewangan PLC 
di Malaysia. Data sekunder daripada sejumlah 100 PLC dari tahun 2009-2013 digunakan dalam kajian ini. Keputusan 
kajian menunjukkan pertukaran juruaudit tidak memberi kesan berbeza terhadap prestasi firma serta peranan dualiti 
dan saiz lembaga pengarah. Di samping itu, pengarah bebas tidak menunjukkan hasil yang baik keatas prestasi firma. 
Kajian juga mendapati bahawa juruaudit tidak mempunyai kesan langsung terhadap prestasi kewangan kerana mereka 
tidak terlibat secara langsung dengan pengurusan firma dimana ini bertentangan dengan hasil kajian sebelumnya. Oleh 
itu, dapatan kajian ini memberi impak penting kepada pihak berkuasa tempatan serta orang ramai perlu dididik melalui 
kempen kesedaran terhadap penekanan peranan juruaudit sebagai ejen bagi mengukuhkan hubungan antara tadbir 
urus korporat dan prestasi kewangan. Tambahan pula, pertukaran juruaudit yang perlu diamalkan bukan sahaja dalam 
putaran rakan kongsi audit, tetapi putaran firma audit kerana ini akan membantu menyemai disiplin dari peringkat 
atasan ke peringkat bawahan firma audit dan syarikat.
Kata kunci: Tadbir urus korporat; CEO/pengerusi dualiti; saiz lembaga pengarah; pertukaran juruaudit; prestasi 
kewangan; pulangan atas aset; pulangan atas ekuiti; Tobin’s Q; Malaysia
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INTRODUCTION
In the past years, regulators and the business communities 
had expressed worries about the alarming rate at which 
firms or corporations collapse due to the mismanagement 
and manipulation of resources as seen in the cases of 
Enron, WorldCom in the United States of America; 
and specifically in Malaysia, the cases of Megan Media 
Holdings Berhad and Transmile Group. Thus, making 
effective corporate governance important in order to 
ensure that businesses are run smoothly. In order to cope 
with these challenges, the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act 
(2002) was released to prevent the auditor from rendering 
most non-audit services to its clients’ firms alongside 
the imposition of a 1-year cooling-off period for former 
auditors getting jobs from their clients as well as a rotation 
of audit partners every 5 years. In order to complement 
the above, the Securities Commission in Malaysia 
issued the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) to nurture more desirable corporate governance 
mechanisms (board appointments, size, composition, 
committee, independence, mandate, and expectation of the 
management, etc.) amongst PLCs. In addition, the Bursa 
Malaysia required all PLCs to have corporate disclosures in 
terms of social, cultural, economic, technological, political 
and ecological responsibilities. Therefore, as a follow up, 
auditors are required to act as corporate agents to ensure 
that the corporate governance mechanisms and disclosures 
provide true and fair view as many users (stakeholders) 
rely on this information for financial decisions. Firms 
can engage known auditors to assure external investors 
of the reliability of financial disclosures in order to 
reduce the agency issues (Anderson, Kadous &Koonce 
2004). Therefore, auditors render a corporate governance 
function in standardizing a firm’s financial reporting 
process (Ashbaugh & Warfield 2003). Now, the issue 
arises as to why the auditors are being switched by firms, 
as well as the relationship between their relevance and 
the effectiveness of corporate governance and financial 
performance of firms.
Even though the corporate governance structures 
have been developed at both country – and firm-levels, the 
differences in the settings of the nations and the companies 
may not make for achievement of best practices intended 
in terms of transparency, accountability and integrity 
at all the spheres of management. Therefore, there is a 
need to determine the effect of governance mechanism 
combination on firm performance, because an isolation 
of the mechanism will not make for effective evaluation 
of the latter. In order to comply with the above assertion, 
our attention is directed towards the effect on corporate 
performance due to auditor switching and governance 
mechanism (duality role, board size and independent 
directors).
Auditor switching could from the corporate 
governance perspective be a function of government 
control/ownership; foreign influence; board size; 
composition of the board; size of the company; manager/
auditor relationships; shareholders protection; chairman/
CEO duality roles; compensation for auditors; and de-
listing from stock market.Meanwhile from the financial 
performance perspective, it could be in terms of losses; 
merger and acquisitions; government regulations; 
accounting standards and auditing guidelines; capital 
markets regulations; going concern issues; financiers; etc. 
(Pong 1999; Wolk et al. 2001; Nazir et al. 2012; Suyono 
et al. 2013).
Previous study on auditor switching had concentrated 
on mature audit and capital markets such as the United 
States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Australia (Woo 
& Koh 2001) where the markets are relatively stable 
in terms of competition and large client environment 
that is controlled by big international accounting firms 
(Pong 1999; Wolk et al. 2001). Few studies made in the 
developing economy have focused on the causes of auditor 
switching rather than the effect (Nazir et al. 2012; Suyono 
et al. 2013).
To the best of our knowledge, no extant research has 
examined auditor switching and linking it tocorporate 
governance with financial performance. Previous 
studies just paid their attentions primarily on the 
relationship between each pair of these three variables, 
such as the connection between corporate governance 
versus financial performance, corporate governance 
versus auditor switching, and auditor switching versus 
financial performance. Theoretically, applying auditor 
switching as mediator appears to be the most reasonable 
path at answering the “how” question on corporate 
governance leading to financial performance. Therefore, 
the encouragement for this study is that it adds to the 
body of knowledge in an emerging economy with limited 
shareholder protection.
The outcome of this study may provide support 
for regulators of other emerging markets afraid of the 
insinuation of auditor competition and switching for 
confidence in financial reporting in the absence of strong 
regulatory support. Furthermore, a study that relays 
auditor switching to management changes, motivates 
for managerial opportunism and signalling, is of future 
importance to policymakers and scholars apprehensive 
of the role of audits in corporate performance.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The 
next section presents literature review focusing on 
auditor switching, corporate governance and financial 
performance. Section 3 explains the research methodology 
employed. Section 4 is on data analysis. Section 5 
discusses the results and the last section concludes the 
findings.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are three theories that explain the reasons for auditor 
switching. Agency theory is used when the rationale 
for auditor switching is associated with agency-related 
incentives for higher quality audit (Francis & Wilson 1988; 
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Nyakuwanika 2014). For signalling theory, management 
teams in relation to agency issues are more likely to use it 
as the reason forswitching to higher quality auditors, since 
it provides better signal of promising expectations and 
indicates that shareholders’ interests are being properly 
monitored. For insurance theory, management teams 
who experience losses due to material misstatements are 
more likely to use it. The audit “insured” companies, are 
presumed to give better audit reports and provide useful 
insight to improve company performance. Nevertheless, 
there are argumentsin the inadequacyof explaining 
the reasons and rationale for the remarkable statistics 
of auditor switching. This is because they neglect the 
behavioural factors and present only partial explanation 
regarding auditor switching (Beattie &Fearnley 1998). 
Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms influence 
company’s auditor switching determination (Lin & Liu 
2010).
AN OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Malaysia is among the earliest to perform corporate 
governance reforms in the Asian region (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2011). Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG 2012), Capital Market 
Master Plan, as well as Financial Sector Master Plan 
are the fundamental references of the development for 
Malaysian corporate governance. These frameworks 
provide the information on the background rules as well 
as the prescription on implementation towards sound 
corporate governance. According to MCCG 2012, corporate 
governance is described as action and formation of 
companies’ activities towards strengthening the prosperity 
as well as accountability of companies in order to achieve 
long-lasting shareholders’ value and the consideration 
of other stakeholders’ benefits. To express it in simple 
words, it is a function of managing companies as to 
provide accountability to stakeholders. The functions are 
oversight, managerial, compliance, and external audit, 
where inter-relatedness with each other takes place in order 
to achieve sound corporate governance practices. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, AUDITOR SWITCHING, AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VS. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
The impact of CEO/chairman duality on corporate 
performance has been extensively debated as there are 
different findings from different research. Tian and Lau 
(2001) stated that there is a favourable association between 
CEO/chairman duality and financial performance in terms of 
operation efficiency (ROA and ROE) and financial strength 
(shareholder’s right ratio). On the other hand, according 
to Hsu et al. (2012), the relationship of CEO/chairman 
duality and company’s financial performance is congruent 
with agency theory, whereby segregation of duty between 
CEO and BOD chairman promotes effective observation 
and control of CEO; hence, leading to good financial 
performance. Peng et al. (2007) found that CEO/chairman 
duality brings both pros and cons to financial performance 
as it acts as a two-edged sword. In a contradictory view, 
Valenti et al. (2011) discovered the lack of support in the 
relationship between CEO/chairman duality and financial 
performance. Past studies had shown consistent results in 
their research of the association between CEO/chairman 
duality as well as auditor switching. In the research of Lin 
and Liu (2010), it is revealed that CEO/chairman duality has 
significant relationship with auditor switching, whereby a 
company is more likely to change to a smaller audit firm 
when the CEO simultaneously holds the BOD chairman’s 
position. According to Ianniello et al. (2013), the result 
is similarto the research of Lin and Liu (2010), whereby 
it stated that there is a negative association between 
CEO/chairman duality and the choice of reputable auditor. 
Hence, our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1 The effect of auditor switch on performance varies 
with CEO duality
For board size, there are different perspectives with 
respect to the association with financial performance 
based on different research. Among the 174 sampled 
companies in United States (US), a positive association 
had beenfound between board size along with company’s 
financial performance (Belkhir 2008). The results 
are proven by the consideration of company’s size, 
leadership structure of board, CEO tenure, independence 
of board, and ownership structure as control variables. 
On the other hand, Beiner et al. (2003) stated that there 
is a negative association between company’s board size 
andfinancial performance. This is because the benefits 
from large board size are offset by the drawbacks such 
as collaboration, communication, and decision making 
difficulties. Past research had shown inconsistent results 
in the association between company’s board size as 
well as auditor switching. According to Ianniello et al. 
(2013), large company’s board size is deemed to have an 
unfavourable impact on corporate governance because it 
results in organizational and coordination issues. Due to 
this reason, a company with large board size switches to 
a reputable and large auditor for it wantsto be perceivedas 
improvingits financial statement’s quality. In the research 
of Lin and Liu (2010), it is revealed that the effects of 
company’s board size in Chinese listed firms towards the 
auditor switching is inconclusive. It may indicate that 
due to the lack of competency in corporate governance, 
companies’ board size does not influence the effective 
oversight function of the companies. Hence, our second 
hypothesis is as follows:
H2 The effect of auditor switch on performance varies with 
board size
Past researchers investigated the link between 
the presence of independent directors andfinancial 
performance from different perspectives. It is found 
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that there is a significant positive association between 
the presence of independent directors in Thai bank and 
financial performance (Pathan et al. 2008). The result 
implies that independent directors are important as they 
have greater oversight than other directors towards Thai 
banks in view that they have a reputation in the market. Saat 
et al. (2011) conducted a more comprehensive research, 
whereby it examined this relationship in the Malaysian 
context from the view of capable independent financial 
director, superior independent director, and existence of 
family members in BOD. It was found that independent 
directors have positive relationship with financial 
performance when there is a capable independent financial 
director or superior independent director. However, there 
was a negative association when there is family member as 
a director. Past studies had shown consistent results in the 
relationship between independent directors and financial 
performance. According to Abidin et al. (2006), there is 
a less chance of auditor switching issue to occur with the 
presence of independent directors in the company board. 
In addition, Zhang et al. (2013) observed that when the 
percentage of independent director is higher, the auditor 
switching issue is less likely to happen. The presence of 
independent directors is quantified by independent director 
rate; thus, it is implied that there is negative association 
between independent directors in company board and 
auditor switching. Our last hypothesis is as follows:
H
3
 The effect of auditor switch on performance varies 
with independent directors
AUDITOR SWITCHING VS. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
Auditor switching leads to the decline in trustworthiness 
and reliability of financial reports. A slump in the 
companies’ stock prices or a rise in the companies’ 
costs of capital may happen after the announcement of 
auditor switching. Nevertheless, there is a controvert 
view formed by Chang et al. (2008) who explored the 
impactof switching auditors from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 
audit firm from 2002 to 2006. It was found that investors 
do not consider the switch to non-Big 4 auditors as bad 
news; and thus, market reaction is not unfavourable. The 
study of Chan et al. (2011) analysed the stock and earnings 
performance of companies after auditor switching. It found 
that the companies’ financial performance is positive after 
auditor switching, regardless ofthe switching among or 
between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.
MEDIATING ROLE OF AUDITOR SWITCHING BETWEEN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE
Lennox (1998) and Ismail et al. (2008) showed that 
companieswith poor corporate governance prefer to 
switch their auditors when there is modified opinionfrom 
auditor. This is because modified opinions reveal that the 
management teams are poor in managing the affairs in the 
companies as these opinions are given when the auditors 
are unable to conclude that the financial statements are 
of true and fair view. These management teams tend to 
“opinion shopping”; which is seeking malleable auditors 
who are of relatively inferior quality and willing to support 
and accept their particular accounting treatments that may 
not correspond with common financial reporting standards 
(Chow & Rice 1982; Weiner 2012). When the auditor 
is switched due to the poor corporate governance, there 
is a market reaction to this matter. The market reaction 
may impact the company’s financial performance, either 
in a positive or negative way, depending on the type of 
announcement (Persons 1995; Chang et al. 2008; Lin & 
Liu 2010; Chan et al. 2011). Yet, the consequence towards 
the company’s financial performance is unfavourable as 
the investors may feel anxious if negative information 
is being hidden in the auditor switching issues. On that 
basis, it is necessary to investigate the mediating role of 
auditor switching in the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance.
METHODOLOGY
This research uses quantitative research approach.
Malaysian PLCs were chosen as the samples because PLCs 
have more contribution towards the growing economy. 
PLCs can enlarge the shareholder base by engaging 
credible investors, who provide sizable capital investment. 
Malaysia was chosen as it is an emerging country with 
her own peculiar laws, culture and technology. This 
study adopts the annual reports, which weredownloaded 
from Bursa Malaysia website according to the selected 
Malaysian PLCs listing from years 2009 to 2013 for 
corporate governance and auditor switching data in order 
to determine if auditor switching had persisted in line 
with the studies of Malek (2005) and Abdul Nasser et al. 
(2006). It also adopts Datastream (web-based) for financial 
performance measurements from years 2009 to 2013 in 
order to achieve consistency.
As identified by Hair et al. (2005), a sample size is 
appropriate and adequate if there are 100 to 200 samples. 
Moreover, there are at least 50 samples needed as to 
achieve low bias of standard error (standard deviation 
of the sampling distribution) in a research that involves 
a single mediator variable (MacKinnon et al. 2002). 
Therefore, sample size of this study is set at 100 samples.
Simple random sampling was applied to avoid the result 
being biased. Allowance of incomplete data such as PLCs 
having incomplete set of annual reports from years 2009 
to 2013 was taken into account for data analysis purpose. 
Those PLCs with incomplete data were not chosen for this 
research. Cleaning data process is allowed when checking 
for the normality of data. A summary of research variables 
are as followed:
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TABLE 1. Operationalisation of variables
Variables  Items Proxies Operationalisation
Independent Corporate CEO/chairman DUAL = 1, if BOD chairman is not CEO
Variables Governance duality (DUAL) DUAL = 0, if BOD chairman is the CEO
   Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Lin and Liu (2010); 
   Valenti et al. (2011);Hsu et al. (2012); Ianniello et al. (2013);
   Yang and Zhao (2014) 
  Board size (SIZE) Aggregation of board members in the board.
   Related studies: Beiner et al. (2003); Belkhir (2008); 
   Pathan et al. (2008); Lin and Liu (2010); Ianniello et al. (2013)
  Presence of independent Quantified by the percentage of independent directors over 
  directors (ID) total directors.
   Formula:
     independent directors  x 100%
             Total directors 
Dependent  Financial  Return on assets (ROA) Measured the efficiency of company in utilizing its assets.
Variables  Performance  Formula:
    Net income
   Average of total assets
   Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Beiner et al. (2003); 
   Belkhir (2008); Pathan et al. (2008); Peng et al. (2007);
   Chan et al. (2011); Hsu et al. (2012); Yang and Zhao (2014)
  Return on  Conventional measure of shareholders’ gain.
  equity (ROE) Formula:
    Net income 
    Average shareholder equity 
   Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Beiner et al. (2003); 
   Pathan et al. (2008); Valenti et al. (2011); Yang and Zhao (2014)
  TOBIN’s Q Ratio of market value of firm over sum of assets. 
   Formula:
    Total market value of firm
    Total assets
   Related studies: Beiner et al. (2003); Belkhir (2008); 
   Yang and Zhao (2014)
 Auditor AS AS = 0, if auditors have not been switched
 switching   AS = 1, if auditors have been switched 
   Related studies: Ismail et al. (2008);Chadegani et al. (2011); 
   Nazri et al. (2012); Weiner (2012)
Control Company size CSIZE Logarithm of assets aggregation of company.
Variable    Formula: log (total assets)
   Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Beiner et al. (2003); 
   Belkhir (2008); Pathan et al. (2008); Peng et al. (2007); 
   Hsu et al. (2012)
Regression analysis is applied and four regression models are formed, which are:
 Model 1: FP = α + β CG + ε Model 3: FP = α + β AS + ε
 Model 2: AS = α + β CG + ε Model 4: FP = α + β1 CG + β2 AS + ε
 Where: Α – Intercept	 	 CG – Corporate governance
	 	 Β – Regression coefficient	 	 AS – Auditor switching
		 Ε – Error term	 	 FP – Financial performance
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In addition, the Sobel test used in examining the 
mediation effect (Warner 2013), is An Interactive 
Calculation Tool for Mediation Test credited to Preacher 
and Leonardelli (2010). In this research, it is used to 
compare the extent of indirect impact of CG on FP to depict 
null hypothesis, H0: DE equivalent to 0. The indirect effect 
of CG on FP is obtained by testing the product of the D 
(CG to AS path) and E (AS to FP path) coefficients. DE = 
(F– F’), where F is the simple effect of CG on FP that is not 
controlled by AS, and F’ is the CG to FP path coefficient with 
the mediation effect of AS. There is statistically significant 
effect of DE product if z-test statistic is greater than +1.96 
or below –1.96.
DATA ANALYSIS
SAMPLED COMPANIES PROFILING
Sketch A
Sketch B
CG F
AS
D
F’
E
FP
CG FP
FIGURE 1. Sketch A: A direct action diagram of how CG 
influences FP
Sketch B: A mediation model diagram of how CG influences 
FP via AS
TABLE 2. Sectors of sampled companies
Sectors Total
Industrial Products 31
Trading/Services 16
Consumers Products 20
Others 33
 100
TABLE 3. Characteristics independent variables and mediating variable of sampled companies
                                   Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Variables  N / % N / % N / % N / % N / %
DUAL BOD equal to CEO 21 21 17 15 13 
 BOD not equal to CEO 79 79 83 85 87
BOARD SIZE  0-3 0 0 0 0 0 
 4-7 63 61 62 63 62 
 8-11 34 35 37 36 37 
 ≥12 3 4 1 1 1
ID (%) 0-10 0 0 0 0 0 
 >10-20 0 0 1 0 2 
 >20-30 9 8 8 9 8 
 >30-40 34 35 35 36 36 
 >40-50 40 35 40 34 27 
 >50 17 22 16 21 27
AS No switch 100 79 80 82 83
 Switch: 
 -To Big 4 0 4 6 4 3
 -To Non-Big 4 0 17 14 14 14
As shown by the above Table 2, the sector distributions are 
not consistent with each other due to the simple random 
sampling technique used in the research. Moreover, no 
particular sector had been chosen as to avoid any bias on 
particular sector in terms of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance, frequency of auditor switching, and firm 
performance.
The Table 3 above shows the characteristics of 
sampled companies. It reveals that more than 75% of 
sampled companies from years 2009 to 2013 had no CEO/
chairman duality in their companies. It implies that most 
sampled companies complied with MCCG; i.e. requiring 
the separation of position between BOD chairman and CEO 
as to ensure a balance between power and authority when 
making decisions. As the percentage of separation of both 
positions increases, it shows that Malaysian companies 
view it as an important feature for sound corporate 
governance.
For board size, Harper (2006) indicated that the most 
effective board size consists of 4 to 10 members, but it can 
go up to maximum of 12 members. It shows that most of 
the sampled companies have a total four to seven board 
members from years 2009 to 2013, which is within the 
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range of 61% to 63% for years 2009 to 2013. The second 
highest board members in board size are between eight 
to eleven; which is in the range of 34% to 37% of the 
sampled companies from years 2009 to 2013. Therefore, 
the sampled companies fulfilled the requirement of the 
most effective board size as stated by Harper (2006). 
For the perspective of independent director (in 
percentage), it indicates that there is a wide range 
between percentages of independent directors in sampled 
companies within years 2009 to 2013. The frequency of 
independent director (in percentage) for range 30 to 40 and 
40 to 50 is the highest. It is in the range of 34% to 36% 
for category >30-40 and 27% to 40% for category >40-50 
from years 2009 to 2013. Only less than 30% of sampled 
companies have more than 50% of independent directors 
over total directors from years 2009 to 2013. Overall, the 
presence of independent directors in most of the sampled 
companies is only 50% or less. MCCG requires that more 
than one third of the members should be independent 
directors on the board, and as such, the companies only 
fulfilled the one third requirement. Nonetheless,they 
should increase the independent directors to two third for 
a sound corporate governance.
By categorizing the sampled companies from auditor 
switching aspect, it is noticed that huge difference occurred 
between the switch and no switch of auditorsfrom years 
2009 to 2013, where the ratio is at 1:3. The percentage 
of no switch is higher due to the culture (long audit 
tenure) adopted in sampled companies from years 2009 
to 2013. Malaysian companies tend to maintain a long-
term relationship with other parties as it is believed that 
relationship is the key to success (Malek 2005). For the 
sampled companies that switch their auditors, the direction 
of switching is more towards non-Big 4 firms. It may 
be due to factors such as hiding the reasons behind the 
auditor switching (Chadegani et al. 2011) as they tend to 
give lower monitoring quality. 
TABLE 4.Summary of regression analysis
 Model Unstandardized Coefficients t-value
 B Std. Error
            Model 1: CG and FP
ROA (Constant) -0.091  1.895 -0.048 ns  
 CSIZE 0.719  0.189 3.807**  
 DUAL 0.267  0.697 0.384 ns  
 SIZE 0.362  0.160 2.259*  
 ID -7.120  2.340 -3.043**
R2 = 0.072   F value = 9.608
Adjusted R2 = 0.065   F significance = 0.000
ROE (Constant) -2.621  2.926 -0.896 ns
 CSIZE 1.491  0.292 5.108**
 DUAL 0.344  1.076 0.319 ns
 SIZE 0.558  0.247 2.256*
 ID -9.676  3.614 -2.677**
R2 = 0.090   F value = 12.238
Adjusted R2 = 0.083   F significance = 0.000
Tobin’s Q (Constant) 0.768  0.114 6.723 ns
 CSIZE -0.009  0.011 -0.754 ns
 DUAL -0.115  0.042 -2.745**
 SIZE 0.010  0.010 1.039 ns
 ID -0.474  0.141 -3.357**
R2 = 0.046   F value = 6.007
Adjusted R2 = 0.039    F significance = 0.000
            Model 2: CG and AS
AS (Constant) 0.268  0.117 2.304 ns
 CSIZE -0.021  0.012 -1.841 ns
 DUAL -0.089  0.043 -2.076*
 SIZE -0.004  0.010 -0.361 ns
 ID 0.097  0.144 0.676 ns
R2 = 0.015   F value = 6.007
Adjusted R2  = 0.007   F significance = 0.100
REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS
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            Model 3: AS and FP
ROA (Constant) -0.860  1.072 -0.803 ns
 CSIZE 0.743  0.184 4.041**
 AS 0.391  0.741 0.528 ns
R2 = 0.032   F value = 8.197
Adjusted R2 = 0.028   F significance = 0.000
ROE (Constant) -3.417  1.649 -2.072 ns
 CSIZE 1.549  0.283 5.473**
 AS 1.044  1.140 0.916 ns
R2 = 0.057   F value = 15.123
Adjusted R2 = 0.054   F significance = 0.000
Tobin’s Q (Constant) 0.576  0.065 8.901 ns
 CSIZE -0.004  0.011 -0.353 ns
 AS 0.024  0.045 0.526 ns
R2 = 0.001   F value = 0.214
Adjusted R2 = -0.003   F significance = 0.807
            Model 4: CG, AS, and FP
ROA (Constant) -0.242  1.905 -0.127 ns
 DUAL 0.317  0.700 0.453 ns
 SIZE 0.364  0.160 2.270*
 ID -7.175  2.342 -3.063**
 AS 0.562  0.731 0.769 ns
 CSIZE 0.731  0.190 3.856**
R2 = 0.073   F value = 7.798
Adjusted R2 = 0.064   F significance = 0.000
ROE (Constant) -2.967  2.941 -1.009 ns
 DUAL 0.458  1.081 0.424 ns
 SIZE 0.562  0.247 2.275*
 ID -9.801  3.615 -2.712**
 AS 1.288  1.128 1.142 ns
 CSIZE 1.518  0.293 5.187**
R2 = 0.092   F value = 10.057
Adjusted R2 = 0.083   F significance = 0.000
Tobin’s Q (Constant) 0.763  0.115 6.635 ns
 DUAL -0.114  0.042 -2.689**
 SIZE 0.010  0.010 1.046 ns  
 ID -0.476  0.141 -3.367**
 AS 0.020  0.044 0.455 ns  
 CSIZE -0.008  0.011 -0.713 ns
R2 = 0.047   F value = 4.839
Adjusted R2 = 0.047   F significance = 0.000
Notes: * represents P < 0.05 (significant); ** represents P < 0.01 (significant); ns represents non-significant
SOBEL TEST
TABLE 5. Summary of Sobel test
Independent Variable Mediating Variable Dependent Variable t-value Full/Partial Mediation
CEO/chairman duality Auditor switching ROA -0.511 ns Full
  ROE -0.837 ns Full  
  Tobin’s Q -0.516 ns Full
Board size Auditor switching ROA -0.319 ns Full
  ROE -0.367 ns Full
  Tobin’s Q -0.320 ns Full
Presence of independent director Auditor switching ROA 0.415 ns Full
  ROE 0.543 ns Full
  Tobin’s Q 0.418 ns Full
Note: ns represents non-significant
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DISCUSSION
Model 1 in Table 4examines the association between 
corporate governance and financial performance. 
CEO/chairman duality is not statistically strong and 
significant (p-value < 0.01) and negatively correlated 
with Tobin’s Q only with a t-value of -2.745. The result 
is consistent with Hsu et al. (2012). This suggests that 
the separation of position for BOD chairman and CEO 
leads to better overseeing of the management on behalf 
of shareholders. For board size, no statistically significant 
linear dependence of the mean of Tobin’s Q is detected. 
On the other hand, it is statistically significant (p-value 
< 0.05) and positively correlated with ROA and ROE with 
a t-value of 2.259 and 2.256 respectively. The result is 
consistent with Belkhir (2008). This suggests that large 
board size plays better roles in monitoring the management 
and leads to a better decision-making.There are also strong 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) linear dependence 
of the means of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q on independent 
directors detected. It is negatively correlated with ROA, 
ROE, and Tobin’s Q with t-value of -3.043, -2.677, and 
-3.357 respectively. This suggests that independent 
directors do not necessarilyresult in good performance. 
When they do not play their roles properly, it can prompt 
faulty investment decisions. The result is inconsistent 
with Pathan et al. (2008), who stated that independent 
directors could oversee the management and retain 
market’s reputation.
Model 2 in Table 4 examines the relationship 
between corporate governance and auditor switching. 
No statistically significant linear dependence of the 
mean of auditor switching on board size and presence of 
independent directors is detected. However, CEO/chairman 
duality is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) and 
negatively correlated with auditor switching with a t-
value of -2.076. This is inconsistent with past studies; for 
instance, Lin and Liu (2010) and Ianniello et al. (2013). It 
is due to the fact that all the past studies were conducted 
in foreign countries. In Malaysia, there is a long-term 
relationship with auditor when there is CEO/chairman 
duality, leading to the low tendency of auditor switching. 
Moreover, the importance of auditor is of less concern; 
and a high power distance in Malaysia that focuses on 
top-down relationship causes no objection from board 
members and independent directors when a less important 
decision such as auditor switching decision is made.
Model 3 in Table 4 examines the association 
between auditor switching and financial performance. No 
statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of 
auditor switching is detectedon financial performance. 
This reveals that auditors do not have a direct effect 
on financial performance as auditors are not those who 
manage the company. The result is inconsistent with 
Chang et al. (2008) who discovered that companies made 
positive earnings regardless of their switching to big 4 or 
non-big 4. 
Model 4 in Table 4 examines the association between 
corporate governance, auditor switching, and financial 
performance. The overall results and significance level 
of model 4 are the results of the combination of models 
1, 2, and 3.
According to Table 5 above, there are full mediating 
effects of auditor switching. When examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance, a significant relationship exists between 
them. However, when auditor switching is added as 
a mediator, no significant relationship exists between 
corporate governance and financial performance; with 
the justification being that the auditors are not part of the 
firm’s decision-making body. Thus, they have to operate 
at the whims and caprices of those who appointed them 
regardless of what the law says. The implication here is, 
therefore, the term or tenure of the auditors should be 
specific, at least three years as in Nigeria as specified by 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 (CAMA 2004 
amended) if they were to be re-appointed. Moreover, 
the law should be stringent in regard to the exit and 
entry which may be factored along the line of global 
best practices, experience and reputation Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002).
CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, the association connecting corporate 
governance, auditor switching, and financial performance 
is evident. Companies should be more focused on 
corporate governance and auditor switching as to enhance 
their financial performances. The regulators are not only 
to ensure the rotation of partners, but the changing of 
audit firms to ensure effective compliance with the law by 
client firms as well as the need to bring in new methods 
or approaches to the audit process that bring about better 
understanding on the part of the management and the 
members of the public. However, Malaysian PLCs are 
still having low awareness on the importance of auditors 
even though all the hypotheses proposed in this study 
are supported. Therefore, more efforts are needed from 
the government to facilitate and educate the public on 
the importance of auditors to companies.However, this 
research suffered from few limitations. Firstly, the data 
used are secondary data and there is uncertainty over the 
data quality, especially where they are not made available 
on a timely manner and where they might have been 
manipulated before the publication to suit the interest of 
the managers and shareholders. Secondly, this research 
covers PLCs only. Thirdly, it emphasises only on the 
nominal variable for auditor switching. It is suggested 
that interview be conducted to explore this relationship 
especially in regard of getting the views of the client 
firm or company in line with the theory of Customer 
Perceived Value. Additional information can be obtained 
due to the flexibility in expressing words. Moreover, 
the future researchers can include private companies 
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as samples to strengthen the representativeness of the 
study. Furthermore, considering the qualitative variables 
such as the reasons for auditor switching as the proxies 
in future research will be an enhancement to the required 
knowledge base in studies of this nature.
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